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Complexity and Accountability: The Witches' Brew of Psychiatric 
Genetics 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of complexity in descriptions of the aetiology of 
common psychiatric disorders. While scientists attest to the discovery of an 
underlying reality of complex inheritance – the so called 'witches' brew' of genetic 
and non-genetic factors – we argue that 'complexity' also performs rhetorical work. 
In our analysis of scientific review articles (1999-2008), we find a relatively stable 
genre of accountability in which descriptions of complexity appear to neutralise past 
failures by incorporating different and sometimes competing methodological 
perspectives. We identify two temporal strategies: retrospective accounting, which 
reconstructs a history of psychiatric genetics that deals with the recent failures, 
citing earlier twin studies as proof of the heritability of common psychiatric 
disorders; and prospective accounting, which engages in the careful reconstruction 
of expectations by balancing methodological limitations with moderated optimism. 
Together, these strategies produce a simple-to-complex narrative which belies the 
ambivalent nature of complexity. We show that the rhetorical construction of 
complexity in scientific review articles is oriented to bridging disciplinary boundaries, 
marshalling new resources and reconstructing expectations that justify delays in 
gene discovery and risk prediction.  
 
Keywords: complexity, psychiatric genetics, accountability, rhetoric 
 
 2
 
After the disappointing failure of the ‘gene for’ paradigm, it appears that scientists 
working within the field of psychiatric genetics no longer adopt a deterministic view 
of common psychiatric disorders. Conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder are now considered complex traits. Such models of genetic complexity have 
gained significant ground, leaving few psychiatric traits or conditions without a 
putative biological explanation. 
 
In the context of the controversies that have dogged this field, we suggest that this 
turn to complexity accomplishes more than merely provide a description of the 
natural world, it also performs rhetorical work. Biomedical scientists appear to be 
engaging in the management of intellectual responsibility, what we call ‘professional 
accountability’. In this paper, we show the ways in which narratives of psychiatric 
genetics employ a variety of invocations of complexity to present psychiatric genetic 
research as cautious, flexible and responsible science. In the narrative of past failure 
and future progress, notions of complexity provide theoretical coherence and 
respectability to an otherwise ambivalent relationship between genetic and non-
genetic factors. 
 
There is a literature on genetics, rooted in the social sciences , which is critical of the 
claims of the new genetics (Yoxen, 1982; Lippman, 1991; Cranor, 1994; Katz 
Rothman, 1995). This paper is not an explicit contribution to this literature; it is not a 
critique of the reductionism of psychiatric genetics. Rather, we adopt a symmetrical 
stance towards hypotheses of genetic causation by focussing on the patterns of 
accounting within a particular genre of the literature of psychiatric genetics that 
underwent a growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These articles, locating 
psychiatric genetics in an optimistic history, come after the failures of the gene 
identification programmes of the 1990s, at a time when the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) promised new informational and technological possibilities. 
 
The most straightforward understanding of the relationship between simplicity and 
complexity is that of oppositional poles on a continuum; that complexity is merely a 
quantitative increase in ‘complicatedness’. However, the turn to complexity is 
sometimes enthusiastically presented in terms of a ‘paradigm-shift’: a Kuhnian 
revolution in which linear and reductionist tools and methods of are replaced by 
nonlinear and dynamic counterparts that are capable of grasping complex objects. In 
contrast with these visions of an a priori objective reality, this paper does not treat 
complexity as a thing in itself, but as a theme in rhetorical/descriptive practices of 
scientific accounting.  
 
The turn to complexity provides new forms of justification. We demonstrate that 
invocations of complexity in psychiatric genetics do not replace the simple, 
reductionist genetic hypothesis, but provide the means to rescue research ventures 
into genetic causation from the failures of the past. The development of a vision of 
post-genomic complexity is accomplished through innovative strategies and 
techniques of persuasion and fact construction. Psychiatric genetics provides a case 
study of the defence of a controversial science: in this case, narratives drawing on 
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complexity account for past failures and neutralize criticisms of genetic determinism 
by incorporating both the unknown and ‘non-genetic’ factors within their theoretical 
models.  
 
Controversy and Hereditarian Ideas in Psychiatry 
In this section, we consider some of the controversies that have shaped psychiatric 
genetics, most of which stem from the central claim that common psychiatric 
disorders have a significant heritable component and explained by underlying 
genetic factors. The history of controversy in psychiatric genetics has many starting 
points. The most relevant for our present inquiry are those emerging from 
hereditarian ideas that informed early eugenic programmes during the mid-
twentieth century (Kevles, 1995; Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002). More recently, we have 
seen the reintroduction of biological determinism into discussions of human 
behaviour beginning with Wilson (1975) and extending into popular thought via 
Ridley (1994, 1996), and Wright (1996). The extension of ‘sociobiology’ and 
‘evolutionary psychology’ has been also challenged from within the scientific 
community following Rose, Lewontin and Kamin’s (1984) high profile critique Not in 
Our Genes. 
 
In psychiatric genetics itself, twin studies are routinely enrolled by the field as 
providing the strongest evidence that genetic factors play a major role in the 
causation of psychiatric disorders. However, controversy has surrounded their role in 
supporting the genetic bases of psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder. Criticisms of twin studies usually focus on aspects of methodology 
and statistical calculation (Kamin, 1974; Wahlsten, 1979; Plomin, 1990; Billings et al. 
1992; Joseph, 2001, 2003, 2006) although the fraudulent research of Cyril Burt adds 
further scandal to the mix (Rose et al., 1984). However, Hedgecoe (2001) has 
remarked that critics often fail to take into account the ‘time lag’ between old and 
new generation twin studies. Critics often focus on older twin studies (pre-1994) to 
ground claims that twin studies are methodologically flawed, while new generation 
twin studies claim to be ‘constantly evolving and improving’ (Winerman, 2004). They 
also claim to be more sensitive to complex traits by incorporating ‘multivariate’ and 
‘covariate’ analysis (Boomsma et al., 2002).  
 
This paper has little concern with whether or not twin studies are actually or 
intrinsically flawed. Rather, our focus is the way in which the ‘simplicity’ of twin 
studies is recruited by the field in ways that seem to both endorse complexity and 
minimize controversy. A more recent controversy is the failure  of genetic linkage 
studies to find ‘genes for’ psychiatric disorders. We concentrate on this period 
because it is in part these failures which are being accounted for in the articles we 
examine.  
 
Linkage Studies 
Technological developments in the 1970s and 1980s provided the foundations for 
great optimism in gene identification research programmes. The development of 
recombinant DNA technologies and advances in chromosomal mapping allowed 
researchers to develop linkage maps to identify the relative positions of mutations. A 
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precursor to the HGP, linkage maps led to ‘highly competitive races’ to identify 
genetic mutations ‘for’ diseases (Cook-Deegan, 1994).  
 
Amidst the high-profile successes of this period – high points include the 
identification of the ‘genes for’ cystic fibrosis in 1989 and Huntington’s disease in 
1993 – psychiatric genetics was inspired to apply the same techniques to locate 
genes for common psychiatric disorders. A raft of highly visible papers reported 
successes in using linkage studies to identify, amongst others, ‘genes for’ 
schizophrenia (Sherrington et al., 1988), bipolar disorder (Baron et al., 1987; Egeland 
et al., 1987), and alcoholism (Blum et al., 1990). But success soon turned to 
embarrassment when other teams failed to replicate findings for schizophrenia 
(Kennedy et al., 1988), manic depression (Detera-Wadleigh et al., 1987; Hodgkinson 
et al., 1987), and alcoholism (Gelernter et al., 1991, 1993). Authors of two of the 
‘successful’ linkage studies that had claimed to find a ‘gene for’ manic depression 
published retractions in Nature (Kelsoe et al., 1989; Baron et al., 1993). As one 
commentator has noted, events of this kind are ‘unusual and embarrassing … among 
scientists’ (Berkowitz, 1996: 43).  
 
Our post-mortem of one linkage study highlights the difficulties in claiming simple 
genetic causation. Egeland and colleagues chose a relatively isolated and 
homogenous sample for their linkage study of manic depression: an Amish 
community in Pennsylvania. In 1987, they published their findings in Nature, 
confidently asserting that ‘a dominant gene conferring a strong predisposition to 
manic depressive disease’ (Egeland, et al. 1987: 783) had been found on 
chromosome 11. However, in the same issue, two related studies found no linkage 
between the genetic markers identified and manic depression in three Icelandic 
families (Hodgkinson et al., 1987) and three North American families (Detera-
Wadleigh et al., 1987). While Nature was careful to report these discrepancies, the 
Egeland study clearly occupied the spotlight, with the editor asserting that ‘the use 
of DNA markers has shown that manic-depressive illness can be caused by a single 
gene’ (Robertson, 1987: 755).  
 
In a later issue of the same year, Baron et al. (1987) reported close linkage between 
manic depression and a region of DNA on the X chromosome. The researchers 
concluded: ‘[t]hese results provide confirmation that a major psychiatric disorder 
can be caused by a single genetic defect’ (Baron et al., 1987: 289). Despite the 
difficulties of replication and of genetic heterogeneity, there was a strong trend 
within the field to support a simple model of genetic causation for manic depression. 
However, by 1989 readers of Nature would have detected a tidal change in the 
waves of retraction and reevaluation of the single gene hypothesis. For instance, 
Egeland’s group published a reevaluation of their own findings (Kelsoe et al., 1989) 
based on a change in diagnosis for two family members as well as new data from 
additional families. Two me mbers of the Amish pedigree received a diagnosis of 
manic depression in the absence of the putative markers and an examination of an 
additional branch of the original pedigree found evidence against linkage. This 
reversal suggests that a theoretical model of genetic heterogeneity cannot, in itself, 
explain away or defend the single gene hypothesis. 
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In acknowledging this ‘false start on manic depression’, the editor of Nature 
conceded that the hypothesis that ‘a gene on chromosome 11 could predispose to 
manic depression was calculated on a delicate balance of uncertainties’ (Robertson, 
1989: 222). Such failures to replicate, it was argued, ‘highlight many of the problems 
that can be anticipated in genetic linkage studies of common and complex 
neuropsychiatric disorders’ (Kelsoe et al., 1989: 242).  
 
In light of such problems, the field of psychiatric genetics began to adopt a more 
complex model in which psychiatric disorders are understood to be the product of 
several genes, which may be interacting non-additively, each with only a small effect, 
with different variations in each family (Gershon & Cloninger, 1994). Technological 
developments in the late 1990s and 2000s, such as high-density SNP (Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphisms) maps and high-throughput genotyping, derived from the 
HGP, provided the foundations for great optimism in the potential to genetically 
dissect complex disease. The articles analysed in this paper are drawn from the 
bloom of review articles that provide accounts of this optimistic turn. However, the 
advent of complexity within this field is not a ‘paradigm shift’. The shift from ‘genes 
for’ to ‘susceptibility genes’ involves a scaling up of gene identification programmes 
without necessarily incorporating notions of nonlinear complexity.  
 
Rhetoric in Scientific Writing 
The term ‘rhetoric’ is often narrowly understood as the techniques of argumentation 
and persuasive communication (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 1992). Drawing from the 
work of Michael Billig (1987) and Jonathan Potter (1996), we define rhetoric more 
broadly as the everyday organization of descriptions and explanations, and their 
relation to different and competing versions of the truth. This relational dimension 
of rhetoric is particularly effective for the analysis of controversies: in the way that 
constructions of fact and description subtly or explicitly counter alternative 
descriptions (Dillon, 1991). Scientific controversies can be analysed in similar ways to 
evaluate the techniques of rendering factual accounts robust and persuasive. 
Descriptions of fact are reworked and reframed to undermine competing accounts, 
and protected or insulated from counter claims. For the purposes of our own 
analysis, we suggest that the activity of formulating scientific accounts as 
descriptions of reality take on both an action and an epistemological orientation 
(Potter, 1996).  
 
An example of these orientations at work can be found in Gilbert and Mulkay’s 
(1984) classic analysis of scientists’ discourse. They show that scientists draw upon 
different ‘interpretive repertoires’ to describe scientific controversies and 
discoveries in the context of research interviews. Interpretive repertoires specify 
distinctive vocabularies and grammatical styles of description and explanation. They 
noted that scientists characteristically use an ‘empiricist repertoire’ to describe their 
work as factual and objective. The empiricist repertoire treats data as primary and 
deflects attention away from scientists’ own speculations and beliefs. When 
scientists referred to themselves informally, agency was often described as 
constrained by rules or by the actual phenomenon under investigation. A recurring 
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feature of the empiricist discourse is the way that descriptions reify their objects, 
making them seem solid and real. Latour and Woolgar (1986) have documented the 
resources that scientists use to work up the factuality of descriptions. For instance, 
what they call the ‘hierarchy of modalization’ is integral to processes of fact 
construction. Low-modality (‘X is …’, ‘we know X …’) treat descriptions as factual and 
unequivocal, while high-modality descriptions (‘X is possible’, ‘X is likely’) are treated 
as provisional and uncertain. Notions of certainty and contingency are not simply 
competing strategies that either bolster or undermine scientific authority; they can 
also be combined to produce cautious, and therefore responsible, displays of 
professional authority.  
 
While research interviews are interesting in their own right for showing how 
scientists’ claims are subtly undermined by the contingency of their own verbal 
statements, written accounts of science have broader rhetorical reach. We believe 
that journal articles provide an important site for evaluating the rhetorical dimension 
of language, the analysis of which helps us to understand the survival of psychiatric 
genetics as a particular discursive style. For this reason, we focus our 
rhetorical/discursive approach on the analysis of review articles.  
 
The review article has become an important form of writing in the sciences, 
especially where there have been steady increases in published information and 
rapid developments in research (Virgo, 1971; Bazerman, 1988). Analyzing these 
articles is constructive for two reasons. First, they can be considered the ‘official’ 
descriptions of scientific activity; their credibility as exemplary statements of the 
field is sanctioned by processes of peer review. Second, these articles reveal a 
relatively stable genre of professional accounting. Greg Myers (1991) has argued that 
writers of review articles give the literature of a field a narrative form, inviting 
readers to extend and continue the story. As the story of the field is developed, key 
events and controversies are routinely cited (or omitted) in ways that provide 
coherence and stability. Christine Sinding (1996) has also noted that review articles 
can be treated as a literary genre that provide opportunities for constructing and 
reconstructing knowledge claims. Review articles are important not only because 
they provide information but because they engage in multiple activities such as 
popularization (Hilgartner, 1990), fact construction (Myers, 1992), and narrative 
reconstruction (Hedgecoe, 2001). Indeed, it is the action orientation of speculative 
and programmatic claims that seek to bridge disciplinary boundaries, gather allies 
and reshape the past. Our work extends on this tradition of textual analysis, taking 
the review article as a clearly emerging genre of scientific accountability.  
 
Methods 
This paper emerges from our ethnographic involvement with the field of psychiatric 
genetics, in particular with a major UK research centre. Reading the literature of 
psychiatric genetics, we identified a particular genre of review writing. These articles 
are neither research papers nor reviews of research, but locate the field in a 
narrative of development. The period of time considered in this paper, 1999-2008 
(inclusive), is a product of the flourishing of this genre during the 1990s as the HGP 
neared completion.  
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The first stage of our sampling strategy was a combined search of PubMed and ISI 
Web of Knowledge using the simple search string ‘psychiatric genetics’. As noted, we 
limited our search to articles published between 1999 and 2008. This generated 906 
journal articles. The titles, and where necessary the abstracts, of these articles were 
examined to identify a particular type of review article. Such articles include a clear 
temporal narrative, accounting for the past and speculating on the future of the 
field. A common feature is the building of a narrative of progress, often explicitly 
signalled by the temporal framing of their titles – e.g. ‘The future of psychiatric 
genetics’, ‘Back to the future’, and ‘Future strategies of psychiatric genetics’. The 
peculiarity of this genre of scientific writing is highlighted by the variety of ways in 
which journals accommodated these articles into their existing categories, being 
described as ‘reviews’, ‘updates’ or ‘editorials’. It was notable that the specialist 
journal, Psychiatric Genetics, carried no such review articles. 
 
This process produced a sample of 35 articles. A process of systematic reading and 
note-taking identified common themes and rhetorical devices. These were coded for 
further analysis. During this analysis, the invocation of ‘complexity’ was identified as 
a key feature of these articles. Therefore, the uses of complexity emerged as the 
analytic focus around which more detailed readings were organized. The journals 
from which these articles were drawn (See Table 1) cover diverse disciplines , 
indicating the transdisciplinary origins of psychiatric genetics, the different contexts 
in which the articles are located, and the range of audiences. 
 
Table 1. Journals from which articles were drawn 
 
 
Following this preliminary analysis, 10 articles were selected for detailed 
rhetorical/discourse analysis. Purposeful sampling was used to include articles 
published across the time period and a spread of journals representing a range of 
specialties, audiences, and locations (UK, USA and Canada).  
 
In the following section, we describe the main rhetorical themes in these articles, 
and present key extracts to demonstrate the devices and techniques used to 
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construct the narrative of the field. Where extracts are reproduced, the use of italics 
adds emphasis for illustrative effect. 
 
Accounting with Complexity 
A common element of the narrative of psychiatric genetics is the emergence of 
complexity in accounting for past failures, warranting delays in gene discovery, and 
justifying new methods. We identify two temporal strategies through which a 
narrative of psychiatric genetics is organized: 
· Retrospective accounting: in which accounts are oriented to manage the failures 
of genetic linkage studies. This strategy involves the routine citation of twin 
studies as evidence to defend the genetic hypothesis; 
· Prospective accounting: in which accounts are oriented to the careful construction 
of the future, invoking the technical difficulties of complexity to moderate 
optimistic expectations. 
 
All the articles examined contain these temporal strategies that navigate a narrative 
of problems, progress and potential. In this section, we show that descriptions of 
complexity are composed of competing assertions about the progress of psychiatric 
genetics. The emerging view of complexity is one that attributes increasing 
significance to polygenic, multifactorial causation, distancing the field from a simple 
Mendelian model of inheritance. Yet, as we shall see, this view still retains an 
interest in searches for single genes associated with psychiatric disorders with 
medium-to-large effects.  
 
One way to accommodate the ‘mixed findings’ of previous studies into a coherent 
model of complexity is to construct these descriptions as ‘factual’ accounts. We 
found that the authors within our sample used a number of rhetorical techniques to 
direct attention away from speculations within the field and towards the ‘objective’ 
mechanisms of disease. An early example of such processes can be found in the high 
impact journal Molecular Psychiatry: 
 
However, common illnesses  pose much greater challenges for geneticists because, in the 
majority of cases, they result from the combined action of a number of different genes 
(each of which may result in  only a modest increase or decrease in liability) as well as 
environmental influences; a witches’ brew termed polygenic, multifactorial causation. 
Further complexities include the possibility of non-additive genetic effects, including 
gene–gene interactions (epistasis), and also potential gene–environment interactions . 
(Owen et al., 2000) 
 
We found that authors who presented the most circumspect accounts of progress 
were often collaborators in the new generation of genome wide association (GWA) 
studies. Working up complexity into a ‘fact’ provides justification for the collection of 
large samples to identify small-effect genes for common psychiatric disorders. 
Making this case requires distancing common illnesses from the study of large-effect 
genes. This is accomplished by contrasting rare, monogenic disorders (‘However …’) 
from ‘common illnesses’, which ‘pose much greater challenges for geneticists’. The 
transformation of speculation into factual descriptions is accomplished by casting 
complexity of common illnesses as the primary ‘complicating’ agent (e.g. ‘they result 
from the combined action’). Complexity is described as the effects of multiple gene 
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interactions and ‘potential gene-environment interactions’. While this offers a more 
definite description of complexity than some accounts, there is a tension between 
uncertainty and object-reality. Various markers of modalization (‘may result in’, 
‘possibility of’, and ‘potential’) suggest that the nature of disease action is provisional 
and uncertain, rather than emphasizing the authority of scientists or their claims that 
genetic causation is complex. Such factual descriptions of complexity transfer 
speculation and uncertainty from the field to the disorders. Complexity becomes a 
constitutive part of the phenomena being studied. These processes of reification and 
ambivalence are recurrent features of descriptions in which new methods are 
proposed. Below is another example, published in the journal Human Molecular 
Genetics during the same year: 
 
The transmission patterns of psychiatric disorders are undeniably complex . It is likely 
that a variety of genetic as well as environmental pathways can increase one’s 
susceptibility to a given psychiatric disorder. This is the concept of equifinality , where 
different initial conditions can lead to the same endpoint […] it is anticipated that to 
increase risk for many complex disorders, multiple deleterious genetic variants are 
required in combination. This is called multiplicative, epistatic, oligo- or multigenic 
inheritance. (Stoltenberg & Burmeister, 2000: 927) 
 
Addressing an audience well versed in methodological issues but not specialist in 
psychiatric disorders, this description forms part of the growing realization that 
many susceptibility alleles will be common variants rather than rare mutations. 
Again, the existence of complexity appears to justify new methodological 
approaches of psychiatric genetic studies. Claiming that psychiatric disorders ‘are 
undeniably complex’ persuasively orients to an apparent consensus in the field. 
Markers of modalization (‘It is likely that … can increase’) mitigate commitment to 
the provisional assertion of gene-environment interaction as an explanation for 
increased susceptibility. This is formalized by the propositional statement: ‘This is the 
concept of equifinality’. Impersonal constructions (‘it is anticipated that’) produce a 
similar effect. They allow authors to distance themselves from conjecture when 
describing epistatic inheritance. Any sense of conjecture or interpretation is glossed 
by the propositional statement that follows (‘This is called multiplicative … 
inheritance’). These formal descriptions of complexity succeed in transforming 
‘disease complication’ into a reified phenomenon.  
 
All the articles in our sample employed this multifactorial model of complexity to 
make claims about promising new strategies and methods. This approach has the 
benefit of confirming the genetic hypothesis while at the same time eschewing 
reductionism by enrolling non-genetic factors. However, such descriptions of 
complexity were frequently accompanied by ambivalence and moderation, which 
points to a curious relationship between simple Mendelian and multifactorial 
models. If psychiatric disorders are ‘undeniably’ complex, why do authors need to 
routinely account for non-Mendelianism?  
 
To answer this question, we turn to two articles that illustrate competing accounts of 
methodological directions within psychiatric genetics. The first article, in the high 
impact journal Trends in Genetics, presents a methodological argument to a broad 
audience of geneticists. Evans et al. (2001) describe how linkage studies can 
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overcome phenotypic heterogeneity (poorly defined diagnostic boundaries) by 
carrying out analyses under several diagnostic definitions. In the case of 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, diagnostic complexity may account for the 
clinical similarity of these disorders. Linkage studies of large family sets have 
produced ‘mixed results’, confirming that psychiatric disorders ‘cannot entirely be 
accounted for by one or a few major loci’ (Evans et al., 2001: 36). However, rather 
than dismissing linkage approaches, Evans et al. argue for combining linkage analysis 
with models of ‘complex inheritance’: 
 
Although linkage analysis has failed to detect loci in a number of study sets, it is striking 
that several genome-wide scans, in both single extended pedigrees and large sets of 
families and sibling pairs, have identified loci showing highly significant linkage. It seems 
probable, therefore, that susceptibility to psychiatric illness reflects a mixture of the two 
genetic models. (Evans et al., 2001: 36) 
 
Notions of complexity are usually invoked to distance the new generation of 
research from Mendelianism, but this passage describes how genome-wide scans, 
designed to detect genes of small effect, can be used to identify genes of large 
effect. The methods used to explore complex genetics also detect Mendelian-like 
(‘highly significant linkage’) genes. This mixing of simple and complex models seems 
at odds with claims that complex genetics incorporates environmental factors, claims 
which neutralize criticisms that genetic psychiatry is reductionist (cf. Rose, 1995; 
1998). In fact, this is precisely the strategy that Evans et al. employ towards the end 
of their article: 
 
Do genetics and genomics hold all the answers? Some commentators challenge the 
whole reductionist approach of genetics applied to psychiatry, dismissing it as a 
distraction from the importance of social and cultural influences. In truth, studies of 
genetic modulation and/or genetic variation are perfectly well suited to explore 
environmental influences, and to move beyond mere description towards a mechanistic 
and mathematical understanding of biological connectivity and emergent properties. 
(Evans et al., 2001: 39) 
 
The accusation that psychiatric genetics is a ‘distraction’ from research into socio-
cultural factors is countered by attributing agency to ‘studies of genetic modulation 
and/or genetic variation’. It is not the scientists who have to account for ‘social and 
cultural influences’, the studies themselves will ‘explore environmental influences’. 
This move from ‘mere description towards a mechanistic and mathematical 
understanding’ may not satisfy the critics if ‘social and cultural influences’ are 
reduced to an algorithm.  
 
While Evans et al. (2001) are excited about the prospects of combining linkage and 
association studies, Kendler (2006) offers a more circumspect account of progress. 
Writing in the American Journal of Psychiatry, the most widely cited psychiatric 
journal, Kendler is sceptical of the nosological validity of family studies, suggesting 
that family aggregation has a tendency to produce false positives because it assumes 
that affected members have the same single dominant mutation. He suggests that 
rather than studying one disorder at a time, it may be more useful for nosologists to 
see if family aggregation occurs across or within diagnostic boundaries. However, 
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even if such studies confirmed that two disorders shared genetic risk factors, what 
explanatory value does this provide? Kendler is sceptical whether molecular genetics 
will provide the same clarity to classifications in psychiatry as it has for other fields of 
medicine. He asks whether psychiatry is at risk of adopting a ‘gene-centred’ 
approach that inflates the diagnostic value of individual genes of ‘modest effect 
sizes’.  
 
Kendler’s critiques are unusual for an established scientist who speaks from within 
psychiatric genetics. He observes that the optimism of the field is closely linked to an 
‘essentialist model’ that assumes an underlying genetic basis for psychiatric 
categories. Such models are attractive and simple to teach: ‘They fit well into the 
traditional medical model, thereby supporting the status of psychiatry as a medical 
discipline … they provide support for an organic disease model where psychiatric 
disorders are understood as resulting from pathological processes in the brain’ 
(Kendler, 2006: 1141). Outlining the progress of the field, Kendler questions whether 
the way forward is to identify genes and then ‘work our way back’ to ground 
diagnostic categories on the foundation of a gene:  
 
By 2004, it had become clear to everyone in the field that no ‘Mendelian-like’ genes for 
psychiatric disorders were likely to be found. Nonetheless, there is continued hope that 
advances in psychiatric genetics and particularly the identification of individual 
susceptibility  genes will alter, in fundamental ways, our approach  to psychiatric 
diagnosis. If we are able to find a ‘gene for’ a particular psychiatric disorder, then we can 
work our way back up and – as predicted by the EGM [Essentialist Gene Model] – 
ground our diagnostic category on the firm foundation of a gene. (Kendler, 2006: 1142)  
 
This extract employs a number of techniques that disrupt accounts of progress. 
Descriptions of the recent past (‘By 2004…’) build a factual account via consensus: ‘it 
had become clear to everyone in the field’. The failure to find ‘Mendelian-like genes’ 
is presented as historical fact. Furthermore, the avoidance of impersonal 
constructions does not impute agency to theoretical models or empirical evidence, 
but to the responsibility of individuals who seek to ground diagnostic categories on a 
genetic foundation (‘our approach’, ‘we are able to’, ‘we can work’, ‘our diagnostic 
category’). Another strategy is to establish a correspondence between ‘Mendelian-
like genes’ and ‘the identification of individual susceptibility genes’. Kendler argues 
that while ‘susceptibility genes’ draw on notions of complexity to acknowledge the 
multifactorial dimension of psychiatric disorders, the lingering hope of seeking 
‘individual’ genes is consistent with the essentialist model. 
 
Kendler’s account of the complexity of psychiatric disorders exercises far greater 
caution than typical descriptions of complexity. ‘Gene sharing’, where the same gene 
can contribute to the production of dramatically different phenotypic effects, 
frustrates attempts to isolate genetic causation. The functional boundaries of the 
gene are ‘blurred’ by processes that alter the structure of expressed proteins. 
Further, the physical boundaries of the gene are blurred by the role of regulatory 
and control regions (i.e. ‘promotors’) which play an important, yet under described, 
role in gene expression. Rather than discrete entities, genes are seen as being 
‘dynamic parts of biological systems of immense complexity’ (Kendler, 2006: 1144). 
In Kendler’s view, it makes little sense to search for the specific genes involved in the 
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aetiology of psychiatric disorders because it is unlikely that these can offer the basis 
upon which to build a discrete categorical model of psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
As we have seen, descriptions of complexity appear within key journals, providing 
not only an explanation for the failure of Mendelian inheritance, but also a 
justification for employing new generation GWA studies. The solidification of 
accounts of complexity into a coherent theoretical account cements methodological 
support for studies designed to find multiple genes of small effect. Despite the 
stability offered by such theoretical descriptions, there is considerable ambivalence 
about the nature of complexity in psychiatric disorders. This ambivalence permits 
interpretive flexibility. The continuing focus on finding single genes  could be thought 
of as a product of lingering methods that are designed to find single genes, rather 
than a lingering commitment to Mendelian ways of thinking. No matter the degree 
to which a multifactorial model proposes a complex relationship between genetic 
and non-genetic factors, the dominant essentialist view always allows single genes to 
play some role in the complex aetiology of psychiatric disorders. 
 
Retrospective Accounting 
In this section, we show how authors routinely invoke historical accounts of genetic 
research to accomplish a number of rhetorical strategies. These strategies can be 
understood if we consider the implicit charge that the field of psychiatric genetics 
has failed to demonstrate the genetic basis of psychiatric disorders. Retrospective 
accounting is a strategy for neutralizing such charges by defending and/or justifying 
the genetic hypothesis.  
 
A common pattern of accounting, appearing in a wide range of journals from general 
medicine to specialist genetics, from clinical to molecular psychiatry, involved 
authors revisiting the findings of twin and adoption studies. If contemporary notions 
of complexity are characterized by the multiplication of ambiguous and confounding 
factors, the same cannot be said about the early studies of heritability, which are 
comparably simple and well replicated. The following selection briefly illustrates this 
pattern of accounting:  
 
It is now clearly established , on the basis of results from family, twin and adoption 
studies, that genetic factors play a major role in the etiology of schizophrenia. 
(O’Donovan & Owen, 1999: 587) 
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to some other complex disorder no susceptibility loci for 
psychiatric disorders have been unambiguously identified. This is especially 
disappointing given the overwhelming epidemiological evidence that susceptibility to 
psychiatric disorders has a substantial genetic component. (Stoltenberg & Burmeister, 
2000: 927)  
 
In relation to substance use, twin studies provide unambiguous evidence  that genes play 
an important role in the development of alcohol dependence. (Dick, Rose & Kaprio, 
2006: 224) 
 
A characteristic of the above examples is their high modalization and extreme 
formulation to construct a factual account that psychiatric disorders have a genetic 
component. These claims of unequivocal certainty are curious: none of the articles 
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mention the methodological flaws and biases of twin and adoption studies 
(discussed earlier in this paper), which is interesting because some of these criticisms 
have been raised from within the field (Kendler & Diehl, 1993). Hedgecoe (2001) has 
observed that in the genetics of schizophrenia, authors provide selective accounts of 
twin and adoption studies which elide such criticisms and bring closure to an area of 
controversy.  
 
The invocation of twin and adoption studies also provides a continuous history, 
connecting contemporary research with the successes of the past, by which present 
concerns about the ambiguity of genetic complexity can be moderated. We identify 
two kinds of formulation in which simple history and complex present are contrasted 
to achieve persuasive results. The two formulations differ in the strength of their 
assertion of the genetic hypothesis. The ‘moderate’ formulation consists of the 
following sequence of claims: 
 
1. Identifying genes for psychiatric disorders is difficult. 
2. This is because psychiatric disorders are complex. 
3. However, history shows that psychiatric disorders are heritable. 
 
The sequence begins with the assertion/concession that gene-identification for 
psychiatric disorders is difficult. This claim warrants an account (‘This is because…’), 
which is supplied as a contrast in the second part of the sequence: psychiatric 
disorders are characterized by complex causation. The second part raises ambiguity 
about the specific role of genetic factors, whether they are single genes of dominant 
effect or multiple genes of small effect. Environmental influences are also included 
as playing a ‘complicating’ role to account for these difficulties. The final part of the 
sequence introduces another contrastive statement that reconfirms the genetic 
hypothesis via historical evidence. Twin studies confirm high heritability rates for 
psychiatric disorders, providing estimations of the proportion of ‘liability to a 
disorder’ attributed to ‘genetic effects’ (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Heritability estimates for selected psychiatric disorders 
 
Source: Owen, Cardno & O’Donovan (2000): 22, Table 1 
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History is used to show that genetic factors are primary, moving environmental 
influences to the background, thus avoiding their potential to obscure the role of 
genetic transmission. As a demonstration of this formulation, consider the following 
extract: 
 
In spite of these difficulties [that genetic complexity is compounded by nosological 
complexity], genetic epidemiological studies based upon operational research diagnoses 
have shown that genes play a role in many of the syndromes defined by psychiatric 
nosology. (Owen, Cardno and O’Donovan, 2000: 22) 
 
The authors explain that common psychiatric disorders are complex, which is further 
‘compounded’ by nosological complexities. The history of ‘epidemiological studies’ is 
introduced by contrast (‘In spite of these difficulties’) to moderate the implicit 
charge that complexity is an excuse for not identifying genes or that genes play no 
role in psychiatric disorders. Epidemiological research, of which twin studies are the 
gold-standard, are enrolled to reassert the genetic hypothesis (‘have shown that 
genes play a role in many of the syndromes’), thereby defending genetic complexity 
while allowing environmental influences to play a mitigating role. The contrastive 
role of history is used in these ‘moderate’ formulations to defend complex gene 
interaction and reduce ambiguity.  
 
In the ‘assertive’ formulation, similar assertions are made but the order is changed, 
as shown in the following sequence:  
 
1. History shows that psychiatric disorders are heritable. 
2. However, psychiatric disorders are complex. 
3. Therefore, identifying genes for complex disorders is difficult. 
 
Instead of defending genetic causation from past failures and present complexities, 
the history of twin and adoption studies is used to assert from the outset the robust 
nature of the genetic hypothesis. This provides a stronger footing for justifying 
current programmes of molecular research. Complexity is introduced to modify this 
assertion without casting doubt over the central assumption. Complexity is no longer 
framed as an excuse for a lack of progress, but warrants inevitable delays in gene-
identification. The presence of ‘the environment’ as a possible causal factor occupies 
a mitigating role in the complexity of psychiatric disorders. This more assertive 
sequence of claims reflects the basic structural elements of this genre of scientific 
accounting. The following extract illustrates this formulation at work: 
 
Twin and adoption studies consistently demonstrate a genetic influence on all major 
psychiatric disorders, confirming work that started in the 1930s. In fact, estimated 
heritability for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and autism (80% to >90%) is much higher 
than that of breast cancer (5% to 60%) and Parkinson disease (13% to 30%), for which 
several genetic risk factors are now well established. In many respects, psychiatric 
disorders are similar to other complex traits that have been studied genetically: studies 
are complicated  by locus heterogeneity, imprecisely specified traits, incomplete 
penetrance and interaction with non-genetic factors, resulting in a low contribution of 
each individual risk allele. (odds ratios <2) (Burmeister, McInnis & Zöllner, 2008: 527) 
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The history of twin and adoption studies provides a solid foundation (‘studies 
consistently demonstrate’) applying to ‘all major psychiatric disorders’. History is 
cast as uniform and continuous (‘confirming work that started in the 1930s’) to 
provide a strong basis for justifying contemporary research. Another technique 
frequently used in review articles is comparisons to medicine, which shore-up the 
resemblance between research into psychiatric disorders and more successful work 
carried out in medical genetics (e.g. ‘breast cancer’ and ‘Parkinson disease’). The 
higher estimates of the heritability of psychiatric disorders are compared with the 
much lower estimates of heritability in the case of other medical disorders. This not 
only confirms genetic causation, but implies the future success of psychiatric 
genetics. The second part of the sequence introduces complexity via the modalized 
expression, ‘In many respects’, to assert the strong resemblance between psychiatric 
disorders and ‘other complex traits’ with a respectable pedigree of genetic research. 
The last part of the sequence elaborates the difficulties of studying complex traits 
(‘studies are complicated by…’) confirming the existence of multiple genes of small 
effect.  
 
As we have shown, the history of twin and adoption studies is contrasted with 
accounts of complexity in two different ways, which are differentiated by moderate 
or assertive formulations. In the moderate version, history defends the genetic 
hypothesis from the criticism that genetic factors play no role, or that environmental 
factors play a stronger role, in the causation of psychiatric disorders. In the assertive 
version, history justifies the claim that psychiatric disorders have a strong genetic 
component, which, as is the case for some medical disorders for which genetic 
research has been more successful, are confounded by complex factors. 
Formulations of certainty and continuity reconstruct a version of history that 
sidesteps the criticisms that are often leveled at twin and adoption studies in order 
to establish a solid empirical foundation and to connect contemporary research with 
a strong, successful tradition. However, this version of history also accounts for the 
present: it reconfirms the central hypothesis that genes do play a role in psychiatric 
disorders; it reduces ambiguity surrounding explanations of complexity; and it allows 
complexity to explain the difficulties of disease prediction in terms of delay rather 
than failure.  
 
Prospective accounting 
Prospective accounting is another strategy within this genre of scientific narrative. Its 
main features are characterized by reprise (revisiting accounts of success and 
failure), condensation (summarizing the main arguments), and recommendation 
(identifying future areas of progress and caution). As we show, prospective 
accounting engages in the careful reconstruction of expectations in order to realign a 
narrative of progress and moderated optimism with the difficulties of complexity.  
 
Within the field of psychiatric genetics, appealing to the future is shaped by the 
controversies of the past. The failure of the ‘gene for’ paradigm in the 80s and 90s 
has led to the emergence of more cautious forms of accounting. This responsibility is 
often performed by explicitly recognizing what the field has not achieved. This is the 
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sobering description offered by one group of authors in Genetics in Medicine, a 
journal devoted to clinical applications of genetics: 
 
Although psychiatric genetics is characterized by unprecedented efforts to identify the 
underlying genetic basis, very few candidates have been accepted as definite risk genes. 
No genes that explain a major portion of the respective psychiatric disorder have 
emerged. Genes with a major effect might not exist; rather, increased risk for psychiatric 
conditions could result from a large number of small gene effects. The availability of new 
methods for genetic analysis on the genome level now allows for studies that were 
unimaginable a few years ago. It remains to be seen whether these new approaches will 
translate into real success. (Züchner et al., 2007: 338) 
 
The authors contrast a sense of commitment and technological progress 
(‘unprecedented efforts to identify’) with the ineluctable failure to find ‘definite risk 
genes’. Risk genes are presumed to be genes of major effect which, the authors 
claim, ‘might not exist’. This is consistent with scientists’ discourse on ‘complexity’, 
marking a provisional break with some of the troublesome aspects of Mendelianism. 
But it also orients our attention to the uncertain future of mapping a ‘large number 
of small gene effects’. Optimism is invested in the ‘availability of new methods’ for 
genome-wide scanning that will enable staggering scales of investigation that ‘were 
unimaginable a few years ago’. In this ‘update’ to clinicians of what can be expected 
from the future, this passage explicitly avoids promise and adopts a more cautious 
‘wait and see’ approach.  
 
As much as responsibility entails the reluctance to make promises, it also involves 
highly publicized criticism of ‘false’ promises. This is clearly evident in the recent and 
ongoing controversial case of genetic testing. The following extract appears in one of 
the highest impact journals in genetic research, Nature Genetics, wherein a fully 
mobilized account of complexity warrants caution about the predictive capabilities of 
genetic tests: 
 
Given the small individual effect sizes of the few identified risk variants and the 
complexities of overlapping genetic risk factors, phenotypes and environmental factors, 
it seems unlikely that genetic tests for diagnosing psychiatric disorders at an individual 
level will be informative any time soon – the launch of a test for a single unconfirmed 
rare variant seems premature . If large numbers of rare mutations are involved in the 
majority of cases, we might need to wait for cheap individual re-sequencing – the 
‘$1,000 genome’, which is  on the horizon. (Burmeister, McInnis & Zöllner, 2008: 537) 
 
A fully developed description of complexity is contrasted with the simplicity of a 
Mendelian test for ‘a single unconfirmed rare variant’. It is interesting to note that 
the kinds of criticism that have hampered the field more generally are now directed 
towards this untimely (‘premature’) development. The availability of a controversial 
commercial genetic test allows the authors to present themselves as responsible 
commentators on the field by implying that they adhere to more rigorous standards 
of what constitutes a ‘confirmed’ risk gene. Even if rare mutations are involved in 
psychiatric diagnoses, this more cautious account defers ‘promising’ until ‘cheap 
individual re-sequencing’ is available to scan the genome for ‘a large number of rare 
mutations’. A common technique of prospective accounting is the deferral of 
promise until the advent of future technological developments, which are located 
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perpetually ‘on the horizon’. Earlier accounts of complexity were more radically 
sceptical about the possibilities for genetic testing: 
 
Indeed, even when all susceptibility genes  for a given disorder have been identified, it 
will still not be possible to predict the development of disease with certainty until the 
relevant environmental risk factors have also been identified and the nature of the 
various interactions understood. Such interactions may be as complex as chaotic systems 
like the weather , which is notoriously unpredictable over even the relatively short term. 
(Owen, Cardno & O’Donovan, 2000: 29)  
 
To the readers of Molecular Psychiatry, which positions itself at the interface of pre-
clinical and clinical research, radical scepticism is maintained by contrasting the 
complicatedness of polygenic susceptibility with the non-linear complexity of disease 
prediction. The authors break from the reductionist model where prediction follows 
mechanistically from identifying ‘all susceptibility genes’. Responsibility is manifest in 
the identification of the role of ‘relevant environmental risk factors’ and in the 
underscoring of the complexity of gene-environment interactions. The non-linear 
complexity of ‘chaotic systems like the weather’ introduces a qualitatively different 
description of multifactorial interactions to cast extreme doubt over disease 
prediction.  
 
While some authors foreground complexity with moderate optimism, others 
consolidate the field’s potential by foregrounding recent technological 
achievements. Systems biology, GWA studies, and the recent turn to 
‘endophenotypes’, are all frequently cited as new directions by which promise is 
recast. The completion of the HGP, for instance, affords more efficient methods of 
gene-identification according to psychiatrists writing in the American Journal of 
Medical Genetics: 
 
Psychiatric genetics is coming to a period of great promise  as the means to identify 
susceptibility genes is becoming easier. With the completion of the Human Genome 
Project, the knowledge of the HapMap, and the imminent possibility of genome-wide 
association studies to complement genome-wide linkage studies, the ability to find the 
genes that cause psychiatric disorder becomes more and more likely … With the 
acceptance that the DSM diagnoses may not be the most informative and that it is 
important to decompose those diagnoses into their component parts, once again the 
field is experiencing a resurgence of enthusiasm. The use of informative phenotypes that 
take into account measurement error and confounding has great potential to become 
the basis of a new strategy to find susceptibility genes for complex psychiatric disorders. 
We hope that as the field becomes more and more technical and statistical, it 
remembers that its roots are ultimately in clinical research. (Szatmari et al., 2007: 586) 
 
Accounts of promise are less constrained when focusing on technological advances 
as opposed to the inherent difficulties of complexity. It is easier to speak of ‘great 
promise’ when the ‘means to identify genes’ represent a quantitative increase in the 
capacity to investigate more genes at any given time. The probability of finding 
susceptibility genes is invested in new molecular techniques of linkage and 
association (‘knowledge of the HapMap, and the imminent possibility of genome-
wide association studies to complement genome-wide linkage studies’). But these 
technical achievements must also be informed by recent innovations at the clinical 
level. Prospective accounting seeks to establish a new alignment between genotype-
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phenotype by moving away from the largely subjective and non-quantitative criteria 
of the DSM. The authors achieve this move by asserting consensus in the field (‘the 
acceptance that’) and by reporting the apparent ‘resurgence of enthusiasm’ with 
which researchers have turned their attention to endophenotypes: biomarkers that 
lie closer to the genetic underpinnings of disease (Gottesman & Gould, 2003). The 
‘great potential’ of this ‘new strategy’ of gene-identification seeks to redefine the 
terrain of psychiatric nosology by establishing stable phenotypes with a clear genetic 
connection. However, the authors imply that as the field becomes increasingly 
reliant on bioinformaticians to interpret the huge volumes of data generated by 
genome-wide scans, there is a danger that the field may drift from its ‘clinical’ 
foundations. This warning comes at a time when psychiatric genetics is increasingly 
characterised as a multidisciplinary and, therefore, more complex, enterprise. While 
early descriptions of complexity can be seen as emerging justifications for large scale 
statistical (GWA) studies, there is a trade-off: as ‘the ability to find the genes that 
cause psychiatric disorders becomes more and more likely’, the taming of complexity 
will become an increasingly technical enterprise. The article, directed at both 
clinicians and geneticists, can be seen as maintaining clinical control by arguing that 
the future success of finding susceptibility genes relies on developing informative 
phenotypes.  
 
Concerns about incorporating other specialties within the field often warrant appeals 
to integration. Expectations of progress are highlighted by mitigating organizational 
and disciplinary factors, such as disputes between geneticists and neuroscientists. 
Neuroscientists claim that genome-wide scans of large samples are untargeted, and 
are likely to uncover weakly associated genes that may have no relevance to 
functional biology. Geneticists, however, are not persuaded by the statistics on a few 
candidate genes whose functional links are poorly established; they opt instead for 
statistical power across much larger case-control studies (Wellcome Trust Case 
Control Consortium, 2007). Such disciplinary disputes over the choice between 
targeting a few genes of biological relevance or searching through many genes for 
statistical significance, allows authors to underscore the ‘political’ obstacles of 
progress. Appeals to integration in high profile journals, like Nature Genetics, 
attempt to rally the field by incorporating disciplines with expertise relevant to the 
search for the genetic aetiology of psychiatric disorders under the aegis of 
psychiatric genetics, by building large collaborations, and by establishing data-sets 
amenable to common analysis. In contrast to the clinicians  who warn of psychiatric 
genetics drifting from its clinical foundations, the following extract challenges 
bioinformaticians to identify ways of integrating knowledge: 
 
Currently, the fields of neuroscience, proteomics, gene expression analysis and genetics 
operate largely independently of each other. Once the functional pathways that are 
involved in psychiatric disorders and their associated traits of interest are identified, 
statistically sound combined analysis of genetics with gene expression and pathway 
analysis will be needed. Testing biologically plausible candidate genes for genetic 
association surely falls into this category, but this approach … has led to many false 
positives and irreproducible reports , probably owing to a combination of genotyping 
error, publication bias and insufficient correction for multiple testing …. Merging 
different data types from separate fields  into a common analysis that results in a joint 
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statistical probability is a bioinformatic and statistical challenge (Burmeister et al., 2008: 
537). 
 
The lack of integration of psychiatric genetics is cast in terms of numerous fields that 
‘operate largely independently of each other’. Possible tensions arising from such 
divisions are glossed as technical and disciplinary. The authors accommodate the 
views of neuroscientists who advocate ‘testing biologically plausible candidate genes 
for genetic association’, but the form of responsible accounting we saw earlier 
suggests that attempts to do so have failed in the past (‘this approach … has led to 
many false positives and irreproducible reports’). The mention of such failures also 
warrants an explanation (‘probably owing to a combination of genotyping error, 
publication bias and insufficient correction for multiple testing’) upholding the 
geneticists’ view that larger studies avoid false positives. The prospective strategy of 
overcoming the boundaries that separate these fields, notably the tensions between 
neuroscientists and geneticists, is a matter of ‘triaging association studies’ to 
incorporate ‘analysis of genetics, with gene expression and pathway analysis’. 
Responsibility for taking up this ‘challenge’ is assigned to bioinformaticians, who are 
key to integrating the knowledge of these separate fields. 
 
Appeals to integration also coincide with the logics of interdisciplinarity which are 
often framed in terms of accountability and innovation (Strathern, 2004; Barry et al., 
2008). Interdisciplinarity promises a more accountable science, responsive to user 
needs while forming closer ties with economies of innovation. Breaking down the 
barriers of scientific specialization and thus promising the creation of greater 
interaction and unforeseen synergies, has clear rhetorical value. In the life sciences 
especially, where problems are constructed in terms of their complexity, the 
development of solution strategies often justify complex forms of social 
organization. This is implied by Zöllner, McInnis and Burmeister (2008) who view the 
multiple levels of complexity as requiring equally complex strategies of investigation: 
‘It is unlikely that a single strategy will allow the identification of all genetic risk 
factors, but this complexity will have to be attacked from many different angles’ 
(2008: 537). Thus, complexity in psychiatric genetics affords opportunities to 
produce novel assemblies of scientific specialties, capital and work.  
 
Discussion 
A feature of the articles examined is the consistent narrative that they present. The 
retrospective and prospective framings are important temporal formulations of an 
existential present: they reconstruct a history of disappointments and a future of 
hope. This narrative also has a further rhetorical dimension: it incorporates 
criticisms, while at the same time deleting or minimizing the controversies from 
which they are derived. This has the effect of producing a history of continuity and 
internal reflexivity, rather than a history of contingency and human error; past 
failures are recast as technical errors of a methodology informed by flawed 
assumptions about Mendelian inheritance; twin and adoption studies are routinely 
cited to provide evidence supporting the central genetic hypothesis; accounts of 
failure are converted into success as the field comes to recognise the underlying 
complexity of psychiatric disorders.  
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In the narrative of simple-to-complex, complexity emerges as an explanation for the 
failure of linkage studies, later solidifying into a theoretical model of multifactorial 
and polygenic interaction. This web of genetic and non-genetic factors, the so called 
‘witches brew’ (Owen, Cardno & O’Donovan, 2000), constitutes a rescaling and 
reordering of the way in which psychiatric pathology is genetically constituted. It no 
longer makes sense to say that there is a ‘gene for’ a disorder. As Rose (2007: 204) 
has noted: ‘the claim is now that mutations associated with increased susceptibility 
can be identified in precise loci in the base sequence of the genes that control the 
synthesis of the proteins involved in the production and transportation of 
neurotransmitters, receptors, enzymes, cell membranes or ion channels regulating 
the activity of neurons’. The emphasis on ‘susceptibility’ is indicative of a new gaze in 
which the molecularization of psychiatric pathology is continuously distributed, 
multiplied, and diffused.  
 
As much as the post-HGP view of complexity constitutes a new way of seeing and 
speaking about psychiatric disorders, the focus of this paper is to show that 
‘complexity’ performs rhetorical work in the way that it preserves hope for a 
research programme. This analysis demonstrates the ways in which a particular 
genre of scientific accounting accomplishes a number of strategic objectives: 
· it exonerates the failure to identify genes for psychiatric disorders by suggesting a 
slowing down of progress as the science comes to grips with the sheer scale and 
distribution of susceptibilities throughout the human genome; 
· it allows scientists to incorporate non-genetic factors, in theory, which insulates 
the field from criticisms of determinism by according these factors an 
indeterminate role; 
· it presents susceptibility as being complex in nature, allowing scientists to engage 
in moderated forms of promising that explicitly avoid hype and thus appear 
cautious and responsible;  
· it allows the field to attribute progress to processes that can address complexity 
via increased speed of production (e.g. cheaper and faster sequencing) and 
organizational reordering (e.g. multidisciplinary integration, large collaborations, 
and data sharing);  
· it allows gene-identification programmes to continue under the hypothesis that 
multiple genes are implicated in disease susceptibility; 
· it confers a kind of respectability to biological psychiatry by adopting the same 
rhetoric of complexity as that of the much larger and successful field of medical 
genetics. 
 
The rise of complexity explanations within psychiatric genetics is a story of 
incorporation and neutralization of controversies. Complexity is cast as a 
sophisticated realization of the further work needed in the field; the simple-to-
complex trope extends this narrative, generating hope by directing attention to 
‘rapid advances’ that will convert complexity into models of prediction and drug 
discovery.  
 
However, the ambivalent descriptions of complexity found in many of the review 
articles not only imply uncertainty about the precise aetiology of psychiatric 
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disorders, but also suggest ways of resolving tensions between different 
methodological viewpoints. The instability of the simple-complex boundary is 
sufficiently vague enough to incorporate Mendelian and polygenic models which, 
rather than generating tensions at an ontological level, may actually relieve tensions 
between competing research practices. In appealing to non-Mendelian patterns of 
inheritance, complexity is neither a straightforward negation of Mendelianism nor a 
revolutionary ‘paradigm shift’, but a shift in focus. Hedgecoe (2001) has noted that 
multifactorial models allow single genes some role in the aetiology of schizophrenia. 
This is because ‘enlightened’ models of molecular analysis employ the same methods 
used to detect single genes of major effect.  
 
The appeal of the ‘essentialist gene model’ (Kendler, 2006) describes much of the 
new generation of research, such as the high profile GWA studies. The problem with 
gene discovery programmes, Kendler argues, is that they assume a one-to-one 
relationship between genes and diagnostic categories; they are more committed to 
extending the ‘parts list’ of molecular biology than properly understanding the 
interactions among the parts. Essentialism reduces complexity via traditional 
methods of nomenclature and resemblance, assuming that disease categories are 
reliable entities. But pleiotropy (that single genes are implicated in multiple traits) 
suggests that the essentialist view does not capture the multidimensionality of gene 
function. Advances in molecular biology are undermining the simple definition of the 
gene. The complexity of ‘gene sharing’ would suggest that the boundaries and 
functions of genes are fuzzy and unpredictable. Kendler argues: ‘Genes are not 
discrete entities like atoms of gold and silver. They are dynamic parts of biological 
systems of immense complexity. The discovery of specific genes that are involved in 
the etiology of psychopathology will not likely prove to be the basis on which to build 
an essentialist and categorical model of psychiatric diagnosis’ (2006: 1144). These 
strong versions of complexity challenge the assumption that genes are natural kinds, 
and thus unproblematic units of investigation. More seriously, these accounts, which 
see complexity as something qualitatively different from the quantitative expansion 
of ‘simplicity’, are sceptical towards the foundation upon which the field builds its 
economies of hope. It is the prospects of anchoring psychiatric categories to a gene-
centred approach that drives the development of pharmaceutical interventions.  
 
The appearance of genetic tests for neuropsychiatric disorders is an example of how 
different versions of complexity are more or less amenable to commercial 
exploitation. Genetic testing for neuropsychiatric disorders is a major goal for 
translational medicine, the so called push ‘from bench to bedside’. The acceptance 
that common psychiatric disorders are complex suggested that it was unlikely that a 
genetic test would be offered to the public any time soon. Nonetheless, three 
companies – Psynomics, Neuromark. and Suregene – have recently begun offering 
genetic tests that explicitly target risk for major psychiatric disorders. These tests are 
expected to be the first wave of the commericalization of psychiatric genetic 
research. Until recently, genetic testing had received little attention within 
psychiatry, but the development of genome-wide scans, offered to the public via the 
internet by such companies as Navigenics, 23andMe, and deCODEme, and the launch 
of a test for bipolar disorder by Psynomics, has raised concerns about poor 
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predictive value (Couzin, 2008; Braff & Freedman, 2008; Burmeister et al., 2008). The 
dressing-up of what scientists now understand to be complex genetic susceptibility 
as something simple enough to be delivered by direct-to-consumer genetic tests 
shifts the burden of responsibility on to clinicians and patients to recognize this 
limited predictability. However, increasing ‘complexity’ by adding more genes is not 
an assurance of more accurate information, since pleiotropy and complex gene 
interactions increase the difficulty of interpretation. Braff and Freedman (2008) 
argue that, since the reduced complexity offers limited or spurious predictability, the 
‘simplicity’ of the direct-to-consumer model may even be harmful to patients. 
 
When scientists contribute to the historical narrative of psychiatric genetics they 
often foreground the complexity of the field as a means of constructing professional 
responsibility. Foregrounding complexity, especially in controversial areas of science, 
accepts responsibility for unknowns, displays flexibility towards present problems, 
and moderates future promises. A discourse of professional responsibility is 
rhetorically organized via elaborate sequences of ‘hedging’ or contrast structures – 
i.e. juxtaposing areas of potential development with methodological uncertainty and 
limitation. These contrastive formulations produce the distinctive ‘cautiously 
optimistic’ framing of progress, often anticipating future problems while avoiding 
accusations of ‘genohype’. It is worth asking to whom are these accounts of 
complexity directed? The range of publications indicates a transdisciplinary focus 
directed at scientists  and clinicians across various disciplines: medicine, biology, 
genomics, and psychiatry. The fact that this genre of accounting is not found within 
the home journal Psychiatric Genetics is indicative of its outward focus. Contrasting 
formulations of complexity also perform different rhetorical functions. For instance, 
strong versions of complexity that foreground nonlinear causation emphasise 
‘extreme caution’, while moderate versions of complexity that foreground 
‘complicatedness’ emphasise ‘moderate optimism’. Mainstream descriptions of 
‘complicatedness’ are more inclined to justify exploring multiple gene models while 
retaining a focus on single gene approaches. Such descriptions are likely to appease 
opposing methodological camps and establish connections with wider professional 
communities.  
 
If foregrounding complexity is a means of performing responsibility when engaging 
other professional communities, does complexity have this effect when engaging 
publics? Brian Wynne has argued that when scientists engage publics, complexity is 
routinely deleted, which ‘effectively denies lack of predictive control, and thus also 
responsibility for it’ (2005: 70). However, depending on the recipient, it can be a 
platform for authority, caution and competence, or an effacing admission of partial 
authority, uncertainty and confusion. Given the peculiar history of psychiatric 
genetics with its narrative of success, failure and moderated optimism, a reader is 
unlikely to infer a loss of scientific authority and control from the incorporation of 
complexity. An admission of complexity that serves as a reason for integrating 
different models, methods, and specialties can be seen as performing responsibility 
to a ‘lurking public’ which includes the interested readers of the scientific literature 
who are not psychiatric geneticists. In the case of the commercialization of genetic 
testing for psychiatric disorders, there are different stakes at risk on either side of 
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the public/professional boundary. When commercial actors seek to profit from the 
results of molecular research the public are sold simple genetics, not the complexity 
so meticulously constructed in review articles. The way the professional community 
has responded to such recent developments illustrates the rhetorical power of 
complexity: they describe the complexity of psychiatric disorders in order to stress 
the poor predictive value of tests based on the simplicity of single ‘genes for’. 
Genetic testing in its present form is presented as scientifically and clinically 
irresponsible, a ‘bridge too far too soon’ (Braff & Freeman, 2008). 
 
This paper demonstrates that scientific accounts of complexity are not merely 
descriptions of ‘complicated’ or ‘complicating’ factors in the aetiology of psychiatric 
disorders, they also perform professional responsibility. This illustrates an important 
aspect of the reflexivity of professionals as molecular biology grapples with the 
volume of information generated by high-throughput technologies in the post-
genomic era. For some, it is tempting to pronounce a ‘paradigm shift’ to denote a 
move from simple to complex gene models. However, the discourse on complexity 
does not entail a straightforward shift from simple to complex. In addition to 
exonerating the field from past failures, complexity appears to offer a justification 
for combining different models, methods, and specialisms under the banner of 
‘psychiatric genetics’. Complexity is not simply a responsible admission of 
uncertainty, but a call for multidisciplinary integration: it seeks to articulate a 
common problem that requires a collaborative solution. The broad range of high 
impact journals in which this genre appears suggests a strategy of developing closer 
links between genetics, neuroscience, psychiatry, and molecular biology. 
Furthermore, as the field becomes increasingly inundated with data, it will rely on 
bioinformatics to resolve complexity. Our analysis suggests that complexity and 
reductionism are not mutually exclusive categories, but that they co-exist at the 
interstices and uncertainties of molecular biology. Descriptions of complexity are 
rhetorically organized justifications for marshalling new resources and reconstructing 
promises. We argue that this particular pattern of scientific accounting is not unique 
to professionals or the field of psychiatric genetics, but forms part of the everyday 
resources for managing uncertainty. 
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